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Dates in notes are given as follows: year, day and month (e.g. 1586-12.5); the sources used
for this essay are listed at the end. If not translated, Venetian and Vicentine magistracies
are in italics. Thanks for advice and assistance to Federico Barbierato, Edoardo Demo,
Michael Knapton and Claudio Povolo. Main publications: L’anima a Dio e il corpo alla
terra. Scelte testamentarie nella terraferma veneta (1575-1631), Venezia, Istituto Veneto
di Lettere, Scienze ed Arti, 1998; L’incivile, disonesta e sordida vita. Storia di un notaio del
Seicento, Verona, Cierre, 2002; “Politica e giustizia nella terraferma veneta del Seicento. Il
tribunale vicentino del Consolato (1640-1690 circa)”, Archivio veneto, 2004, CLXIII, pp.
53-92. The author’s current research is concerned with the jurisdictional, fiscal and
symbolic features of relations between Venice and Vicenza during the crisis years of the
war of Crete (1645-1669).
 
Introduction
1 Shaped by the historiography of the early modern centuries, the myth of Venice portrays
it as an ideal republic founded on wise laws and the public spirit of a ruling elite devoted
to the service of the state, governing a strong maritime empire and a largely autonomous
Italian mainland state  (Terraferma).  Alongside  this  benevolent  view,  there  emerged a
countermyth depicting the Serenissima as  a  repressive state,  governed by a secretive,
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tyrannical  oligarchy;  in  this  portrayal  the  Council  of  Ten  (Consiglio  dei  Dieci),  the
Republic’s supreme judicial body, is often represented as a “tribunal of blood”. The myth
first emerged as a representation of the city in the late Middle Ages, when its fleets and
overseas  commerce  were  both  substance  and  symbol  of  Venetian  magnificence.  The
countermyth began to take shape in the mid fifteenth century, when Venice extended its
control over Italian mainland towns such as Padua, Verona, Vicenza and others, whose
political  liberties  were supposedly  suffocated.  Many generations  of  historians  largely
contented themselves with these two contrasting stereotyped representations, and only
in the past three decades have scholars actually explored the internal working of the
mainland state and related it to the myth itself. Thank to recent research on Venetian
and mainland social history it is now in fact possible to detect an almost incessantly fluid
situation in terms of the composition of status groups, the interweaving of interests, the
handling and balance of power, etc.
2 In  the  early  modern  period  Italy’s  regional  states  were  quite  unlike  Europe’s  major
monarchies. Italian states had in fact an articulate political structure and a distribution of
power not yet dominated by the center.  Venetian aristocratic power could hardly be
compared to the types of authority that took root in other European and even Italian
states.  The  Venetian  pragmatism,  jealously  conservative,  was  unable  to  exploit
bureaucratic or hierarchical structures to connect center and periphery and to advance
mainland families. Government was in fact based on a conception of sovereignty that
boiled down to the rights of  Venice’s aristocrats,  without a more totalizing vision of
statehood; the predominant center was never integrated with the peripheral societies,
wich often had large cities within them whose identity was thereby squashed.
3 Vicenza proudly proclaimed itself the firstborn of Venice, and indeed when it voluntarily
accepted  Venetian  rule  in  April  1404  it  received  the  confirmation  of  a  number  of
privileges favouring local autonomy in both fiscal and jurisdictional matters1. Perhaps the
most important of them was the confirmation of the ancient magistracy of the Consulate (
Consolato). Among the various Venetian subject cities’ courts, this tribunal staffed mainly
by jurists  belonging to the city’s  aristocracy was in fact  the only one empowered to
condemn criminals to death; furthermore in 1545 it also acquired the right to banish
certain types of criminals from the whole territory of the Venetian state. The Consulate
was  the  fundamental  instrument  with  which  the  Vicentine  aristocracy  was  able  to
manage local conflicts, succeeding in doing so in competition with the Venetian courts
both local and central.
4 By the late sixteenth century Venice could no longer tolerate too weak a political control
over the mainland and employed diverse tools to assert its supremacy something that
also happened in other areas. Considerable interference with subject cities’ autonomies
accompanied an equally considerable extension of the administrative and judicial power
exercised by Venetian magistracies. The Council of Ten then gradually acquiring greater
political and judicial importance to the detriment of other, broader bodies more in line
with the republican tradition was then particularly important as a source of laws and
judgements which weakened the old institutional order that still characterized the great
cities of the mainland. Its action in fact heavily diminished the role of local courts, and
consequently the overall power of the provincial elites.
5 The old aristocracy of the Terraferma lost political legitimacy and suffered the erosion of
its traditional ritual and symbolic importance, and reacted by generating social unrest.
The mechanisms governing the ancient practice of the feud,  which for centuries had
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regulated relations among the powerful noble lineages, were violently dislocated under
the pressure of new social and political circumstances.
In face of the mounting criticism of their privileges, the growing contempt for their
persons,  and  the  erosion  of  the  territorial  foundations  of  their  authority,  the
nobility were foolish enough to attempt a counter-attack, the most visible feature
of which was an overweening arrogance, symptomatic of their basis insicurity.
6 Meanwhile in England Elizabeth did her best to protect her nobility from insult2, in the




7 On 3 April 1585 Guido Capra and Muzio da Porto solemnly embraced each other in the
presence of the bishop and the two Venetian governors of Vicenza (podestà and captain),
so as to confer solemnity on a act of pacification which was intended to end a long and
bloody conflict3. The act referred generically to a violent brawl that had occurred ten
years previously; it further mentioned a large group of allies of both factions who had
been bound to peace and annulled all the legal proceedings that ensued from the conflict
of 12August 1575. On that occasion Muzio had seriously injured Guido, and that episode
was followed by clashes between armed men,  arson attacks on palaces,  murders and
consequent prosecutions. But what had become open war between the two sides had been
smouldering since the end of the 60’s,  when the artisan Bortolo Balestraro had been
attacked in his shop by Alvise Capra and three of his henchmen and had dared to meet
violence with violence,  leaving his  main assailant  mortally  wounded.  Retaliation had
followed immediately, all the stronger because at a party the honor of Alvise Capra’s sons
had been purposely provoked by Ludovico da Porto (son of Bernardino)4.
8 Bortolo had died shortly afterwards in Apulia, where he had sought refuge after being
permanently banned from Vicenza. The Capras’ attention had then turned to Bortolo’s
uncle and accomplice Iseppo dal Castello, and after various unsuccessful attempts – they
had offered 200 ducats to whoever would “cut him to pieces” – on 19 April 1572 hired
assassins reached the man in Venice. Although he had been stabbed in the shoulder and
knifed in the throat, a sword thrust through his body, Iseppo had miraculously survived.
Alvise Capra’s son, Guido, the principal defendant in the trial consequently conducted in
Venice, revealed then that Iseppo had been protected, paid and pushed towards criminal
proceedings by the da Portos, whom he had served “with his arms and his life”5.
The 1585 act of pacification, however, contained a clause that betrayed a dangerous
weakness: Ludovico da Porto, son of Camillo, had not accepted the agreement. The
men of his faction therefore bound themselves not to offer him lodging or help
until he had made peace with his enemies.
9 By that time Count Ludovico da Porto had already been banished and condemned to the
confiscation of his property by the Council of Ten6. His property had been assigned at
auction for 1,000 ducats to a man fronting for his family two days before the act of
pacification. They had obviously had to forego protection of their over-obstinate relative
after recovering his considerable wealth for a nominal sum – a single share of it was later
valued at 11,000 ducats – presumably with the tacit consent of their adversaries.  The
agreement also sealed the reestablishment of the unity of Vicenza’s aristocracy in the
defence of the ancient privileges granted in 1404, when the city had voluntarily entered
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the Venetian State. On 4 November 1585 Francesco da Porto and Odorico Capra, acting in
the name of the city but evidently also representing their respective factions, were able
to appear jointly in Venice to petition for the repeal of limits that the Law of the Five Cases
had recently imposed on the Consulate. The law allowed the Venetian governors of the
main town of the Terraferma to pursue five particular dangerous crimes: road robberies,
domicile robberies, rapes, murders made by masked men and arsons7.
 
Hard Times
10 In times characterized by stable relations and clearly defined roles in power-handling, a
peace between opposing groups, even if they go as far as murder, quickly restores the
balance via visible adjustments imposed by the mediation of an authority recognized by
all  the  contestants.  Pacification  therefore  becomes  the  main  means  whereby  a  feud
reveals  its  essential  function  in  reestablishing  a  preexisting  order8.  Should  outside
intervention – for instance by state authority – instead modify the normal procedures of
peacemaking, the restraints on violence cease to function. During periods of rapid social
change, the traditional mechanisms controlling rivalry between families are unhinged,
pacifications lose their political significance and efficacy, and unrestrained vendetta is set
loose9.
11 In the decades either side of 1600 the Venetian mainland state was infested with outlaws
and armed bands often led by nobles.  They disposed of  depositories  of  firearms and
scores of satellites (called bravos, or hired henchmen) through whom to spread terror. As
well as oppression, violence of every sort and crime, they practised detention in private
prisons  and unauthorised banishment –  the  latter  actions  representing usurpation of
sovereign power. In the denunciation presented to the Council of Ten in November 1579
by one of his victims, Ludovico da Porto is portrayed as a stereotype tyrant: he is in fact
the sum of all the connotations just mentioned, and exercises tyranny over the property,
honor and blood of the poor peasants10.
12 But by then the state had already fully grasped the inefficacy of actions which, though
hitting criminals hard, barely grazed the nerve centres which sustained their deeds and
protected them while they were in hiding. Public order needed to be reestablished with
exceptional measures able to strike right to the heart of the groups the outlaws belonged
to, by undermining their bases ofwealth. The alarm that the situation caused is confirmed
by a series of legislative measures which aimed at stemming criminality by making the
penalties  more  severe  even  for  those  who  favoured  or  at  least  tolerated  it.  On  26
September 1578 a law promulgated by the Council of Ten against murders pensati and in
insidie (respectively premeditated and achieved through ambushes) had prescribed the
confiscation of the criminals’ property, breaching not only the legitime portion, but also
the inviolability of fideicommissa11. In such a way there was direct damage to the relatives
of young adults who had no legal entitlement to property, and who precisely for this
reason had often been used as belligerents by their respective families. Twenty years later
podestà Correr could assert that the ancient rivalries finally appeared to be placated since,
while the exile imposed by banishment was greatly feared, an even greater threat was the
loss of the property with which families give lustre to the fame of lineage and virtue12.
13 This  action  aiming  to  obstruct  the  solidarity  of  aristocratic  lineagestowards  their
members who were convicted of crime was an addition to previous measures intended to
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create  scorched  earth  around  outlaws.  In  December  1560  the  Council  of  Ten  had
authorised the killing of anyone caught in flagrante crimine, with specific reference to the
role of rural communities, thus attributing a sort of political recognition to them that was
later extended in 1574. In 1580 Senate of Venice had assigned extraordinary powers to
the mainland governors and decided to intensify collaboration with neighbouring states
to favour extradition from them13. Thereafter there had been a continuous series of laws
on public order. On 28 October 1578 Bernardino Lippomano, former podestà in Vicenza,
presented his  report  to  the  Senate  and complained of  the  negative  consequences  of
measures  whereby  outlaws  could  redeem  themselves  by  killing  other  outlaws,  and
requested the confirmation of an earlier law, dated 1502, which had established that an
outlaw, after being once freed,  could only be freed from any subsequent sentence of
banishment via a judicial pardon. Lastly, the promulgation of the already mentioned Law




14 Venetian administrators found it  necessary to mediate between the various councils,
legal  bodies  and  informal  institution  present  in  both  the  subject  cities  and  the
countryside surrounding them. Because of its peculiar constitutional organisation, the
settlement  of  many  matters  requiring  mediation  and  negotiation  in  the  Republic  of
Venice has been interpreted by historians as the outcome of relations between systems of
families,  and the process of  mainland government in particular as a sort of  complex
dialectic  involving  local  institutions  and interest  groups,  each of  them with  its  own
powers and privileges15. The Venetian mainland state was in fact a complex mosaic of
diverse  political  structures:  local  grandees,  feudal  lords,  patrician  elites,  privileged
corporations and peasant communities.  The coexistence of multiple forms of political
organization and the interplay of such a variety of institutions also explains not only the
survival but also the usefulness of such apparently irrational social practice as feuds and
clientage networks.
15 In practical terms this sort of mosaic of power-handling meant the coexistence of various
magistracies  and  courts  of  justice,  both  local  and  central. In  Vicenza  crimes  were
generally judged by the Consulate, whose judges were four lawyers and eight nobles, all
from Vicenza, together with the Venetian podestà and three other jurists (the Assessori)
appointed by him. The courts of the two Venetian governors (the cortepretoria and the
corteprefettizia)  had criminal  competence  over  fiscal,  military  and few other  types of
offences.  In  some  instances  the  Council  of  Ten  delegated  to  the  city  governors
extraordinary authority to use the Council’s own summary procedure, an authorization
that enabled them to override the local statutes and the traditional forms of dispute
settlement. In addiction the presumed victim (or the accused) could petition the Council
of Ten, asking it to judge the case or delegate it to a Venetian court for trial. He could also
ask for the intervention of the Venetian Avogaria,  which was a prestigious magistracy
with  general  responsibility  for  the  correct  functioning  of  judicial  activity,  and  the
intromissione (procedural  interference)  of  an  Avogadore determined  the  temporary
interruption of trial proceeding16.
16 In the second half of the sixteenth century new political actors – among them the rural
communities of each province organised into representative and administrative bodies
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called Corpi territoriali – came to the forefront of the political scene, claiming an active
role in the management of local political affairs. Since Venice had a strong interest in
weakening the traditional  authority of  the urban oligarchies,  it  encouraged this  new
development in terraferma politics, and this too contributed to causing the crisis in the
mainland aristocracy’s social role and political legitimacy.
17 Venice’s elite families and their equivalent ones in the subjected towns, which in the past
could  be  schematically  distinguished  by  the  very  values  that  characterised  them –
merchants  descending  from the  original  Stato  da  mar  (State  of  the  sea)  the  former,
townsfolk and feudal dwellers, however deeply rooted in the property comprising their
district, the latter – were sharing a common ideology, and the same entrepreneurial and
often  competitive  effort;  they  also  viewed their  territory  in  terms  of  economic
investment.
18 Yet at the same time, they were separated by the divide resulting from their involvement
in the political life of the state as well as by the so-called separatezza giuridica (juridical
separation), clearly moulded from the jus commune then in use in the mainland – of which
the University of Padua was one of the most prestigious European schools – and from the
Statutes in force in Venice; such separation encouraged to a certain extent some sort of
equilibrium  in  the  autonomy  between  the  central  powers  (composed  exclusively  of
members from Venice’s nobility) and the periphery (the elite townsfolk)17.
19 In the second half of the sixteenth-century the spreading of the ownership of private
property by Venetians on the mainland was fostered by the progressive liquidation of
public debt initiated in 157718. This was accompanied by the dramatic crisis in the woollen
industry.  In  1596  theVenetian  captainGiacomo  Bradadin  lamented  a  slump  in  the
production of cloth goods in the Vicenza area from approximately 3,000 to 200 rolls of
cloth per year, a setback which even the contemporary gains in the booming silk industry
could not fully overcome19. As a result, local elite families would see their patrimonial
bases diminished and a subsequent loss in power, while a new social class of parvenus 
emerged, attempting to usurp the formerly privileged classes and upset the social and
economic equilibrium established in the early years of the fifteenth-century.
20 The political situation of Vicenza deteriorated as a result of the antagonism between two
factions of rather vague outlines. Seventeen years ago, an important study attempted to
delineate the fundamental characteristics of the two groups: the da Porto family had led
the oligarchic faction of the ancient Venetian loyalty, while the group led by the Capra
family gathered a collection of both old pro-imperial families and the newer members of
the wealthy nobility20. However, the sources attest to the malleability and adaptability of
the alliances and pretensions of faith – for example, many among the da Portos served in
the imperial  army –  which accounted for  the frequent  shifts  among members  of  the
opposing factions21.
21 In 1541 Venice establisheda one-year vacancy for the offices of the Council of 100 (Minor
Consiglio dei 100)of Vicenza – the true center of local power – consenting the incorporation
of some of the new families. These families, throughtheir loyalty to the Capras, were to
gradually shift the established balance of power towards the anti-oligarchic faction. The
da Portos perceived the nature and dimensions of these adversarial actions in January
1567 – a year that saw the first manifestation of Ludovico’s violence – and even attempted
an unrealistic  “lockout” of  the Minor  Consiglio.  Meanwhile,  riots,  brawls  and murders
multiplied exponentially in the form of vendetta feuds, until a “Superintendent for Law
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and Order” sent from Venice was able to finally restore order and impose the peace of
1585.
22 Merchants,  notaries,  agrarian capitalists  and wealthier townfolk,  each belonging to a
specific  association  in  their  respective power  centres –  trade  corporations,
confraternities,  professional  colleges  and  territorial  boards –  would  overwhelmingly
burst onto the political scene and provoke conflict. Circumventing the hegemony of local
law-courts,  these protagonists appealed directly to the magistrate of the capital,  thus
avoiding  the  control  of  local  oligarchy.  Yet,  in  this  case  it  is  necessary  to  proceed
cautiously: very often behind such initiatives the shadow of a probable wheeler-dealer
can be seen, as is demonstrated by the example of the denunciation to the Avogaria by
Iseppo dal Castello, supported by the da Portos.
23 The major aristocratic families often reacted by appealing to anachronistic conceptions of
honour.  For  the  young  generation  thrust  into  public  limelight,  heavily  tied  to  an
education organized around the significance of social rank and station, it was not easy to
compromise with the world of peasants, merchants and artisans.
24 The younger cadet branch, in particular, often demonstrated an unwillingness to share
the leading patriarchs’ attempts to mostly safeguard the family estate. The testaments,
full of ancient obsolete clauses such as the strong ties of fideicommissa and primogeniture,
eventual  attempts to boost  one’s  riches by accepting dowries  and women even from
merchant  families  and,  lastly,  the  disinheritance  of  those  descendants  convicted  of
serious crimes, filled many people, who considered themselves victims of these quibbling
juridical measures and economic stratagems, with indignation22. The damaged pride and
exasperation of the violated often produced exuberant violence that transformed noble
feuds into competitions for those spaces of political power remaining to be had23. But the
splits produced by these situations did not exhaust their devastating energy either within
the violent factions and the private armies which opposed each other in the streets of the
city, or in the abuse of power from a myriad of mercenary armed men roaming around
the countryside; the emerging figure of fratricidal war was also looming on the horizon24.
25 Such violence certainly was not new, but the aristocracy’s crisis could hardly contain its
manifestations of self-destruction. By diverting the most important criminal trials to the
tribunals of Venice and, above all, by authorising the use of their own rito inquisitorio
(inquisitorial rite), the Council of Ten strongly limited the power of the Consolati and, with
them, the ancient guarantees of compensatory justice.
 
Pride and Honor
26 It was in this particular context and time that the course of the Count Ludovico da Porto’s
life  unfolded.  He was  at  first  a  young hero,  then a rich landowner,  finally  an awful
criminal.  We possess  two descriptions  of  him:  the  first  is  given by his  proud father
Camillo who relates his son’s departure with the Christian fleet, the second comes from
his worst enemy, the lawyer Lucillo Cereda, and it was forwarded to the Council of Ten for
the purposes of da Porto’s identification and arrest. According to the first description
(about 1570), Ludovico is delighted at leaving his palace to go on board in Pesaro. He is a
refined, self-reliant, promising young man and he wants to test himself. A servant and
two of his best greyhounds accompany him. In May 1586, some months before his death,
he is a thin man with dark hair, a nose bent to one side (probably broken), he stammers
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and limps and a considerable scar on his face makes him conspicuous. By this time, he is
only  accompanied  by  famous  brigands.  The  period  between  these  two  descriptions
constitutes the crucial phase of his life25.
27 The da Porto were appointed knights since 1489 and palatine counts since 1532; several
members of the family took up military careers, holding prestigious command positions
within the Imperial and Venetian armies. Luigi da Porto, who was captain of light cavalry,
fought in Friuli  during the War of  the League of  Cambrai  (1509-1516).  Crippled by a
wound,  he devoted himself  to literature and history,  leaving us theyearning story of
Giulietta later immortalized by Shakespeare. Francesco, elected general of the Serenissima 
on 25 May 1532, represents the most prestigious military role during the modern age.
Others, such as Giovanni of the mid-fifteenth century, and Ludovico’s father Camillo, a
century later, were very famous and influential jurists. Paolo, a canon of the cathedral
and Simone,  the Archdeacon,  fought long and hard against  the bishop of  Vicenza to
protect their benefices. The importance of the role played by the da Porto’s family in the
contemporary  humanistic  debate,  which  was  linked  to  Catholic  reform  and  later  to
Calvinistic reform in Vicenza, has been only recently discovered, while the mercantile
and industrial context in which they moved is generally only hinted at.For the whole of
the fifteenth century and the first decades of the following century, the da Portos were
leaders in the production and trading of silk and wool, the two economic activities that
made Vicenza one of the most important industrial districts of the Repubblica: they ran
some shops and, although the important Rialto market in Venice was their main market
outlet, as manufacturers and merchants they also reached cities as far as Naples, Rome
and  Lyons.  Equally,they  were  not  unrelated  to  the  other  productive  sectors  which
included the glass-blowing industry, the extraction of minerals and the production of
paper26.  Iseppo, cousin of Ludovico,  was the purchaser of a grand Palladian palace in
Vicenza, while around 1580 the Castelvecchio branch of the family had commissioned
Andrea Palladio the incomplete palace in piazza Castello, a surreal architectural paradox
which  unintentionally  reflect  the  cracks  within  the  solidarity  of  the  house.  At  the
beginning of the sixteenth-century the Da Portos were divided into ten branches, the
major of which was that of Leonardo the posthumous – born after his father’s death –
who was Camillo’s father and grandfather of the protagonist of the events we consider27.
28 In 1567 Ludovico had forced one of his men to beat the vicar of a bishop. In the successive
military battles against the Turks he was probably forced to pay for that episode when
the  Council  of  Ten  sanctioned  a  condemnation  of  three  years  of  confinement  in
Capodistria. In April 1571 Vicenza had offered 12,000 ducats and two ships to the struggle
for the defense of Cyprus which had been attacked by the Turks: the Torre di  Vicenza
(Tower of Vicenza) was captained by Ludovico da Porto while the Uomo Marino (Seaman)
took  orders  from Giacomo  Trissino.  On  the  morning  of  7  October  1571,  following  a
collision with the imposing Turkish flottila, Giacomo Trissino fell gloriously during the
day while Ludovico da Porto survived and attained a reputation of honor28.
29 Now a consecrated hero,  in 1573 he inherited an enormous fortune,  which he could
dispose of only to a limited extent due to testamentary clauses existing between father
and grandfather29. Ludovico then became the despotic lord of Cresole, a small village near
the northern gates of Vicenza.  His violent conduct reemerged in 1579 with the well-
known murder of a peasant. The murder led first to his imprisonment in the Torre di
Vicenza (a trick of destiny as Lepanto’s battleship and the town prison bore the same
name) and then to incarceration in the prison of the Council of The Tenin Venice. After
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five  years  of  pre-trial  detention,  in  1584  he  was  condemned to  twenty-two years  of
confinement in Retmo, on the island of Crete, and to the confiscation of capital, resources
and property30.  Having escaped from the ship that would have conducted him to the
Aegean island, he immediately returned to Vicenza for revenge. He began to carry out his
plan on 21 July 1585 with the assassination of Francesco Cereda, chaplain of the Duomo
and parish priest  of  Cresole.  Ludovico planned a brutal  and sacrilegious murder:  the
priest was to be taken by surprise during the celebration of Sunday mass. Da Porto forced
all those present to leave the church before savagely attacking him. His body was ravaged
by dozens of stabs31.
30 On 26 July the Council of Ten added to the condemnation of 1584 a reward of 2,000 ducats
to whoever would kill him outside the state. Whoever produced proof of murder – which
meant displaying the head of the condemned on the public rock of the proclamation –
would obtain,  in addition to a  reward,  full  liberation for  another two convicts;  such
benefits were equally acknowledged to the accomplices that had participated in the crime
of Cresole. Lastly, the closest relatives of the victim were enfeoffed with all of Ludovico’s
property –  including  land  that  had  already  been  auctioned  off  for  1,000  ducats  and
despite the fideicommissa and other oppositions –  in compliance with the provisions set
forth by the law of 1578.
31 Heading up a strong rank of followers, Ludovico continued his dedication to raids and
crimes, sowing terror. His criminal career would conclude tragically with his death in the
autumn of 1586, when some of the members of his band, enticed by the thought of the
proceeds they would receive, killed him in his sleep, along with four of his accomplices32.
One of these was the noble Marco Loschi, whose criminal career had parallelled that of
Ludovico. The existential journey which led these men to become ruthless criminals was
not dissimilar from the experiences of many during these times. Their fate as victims in
the wars among major competing families represented the tragic difference.
32 On 14 May 1578, the Council of Ten put an end to the imprisonment served by Muzio da
Porto for wounding Guido Capra. One month later the trials of brothers Marco and Nicolò
Loschi  were  forwarded  to  the  Avogaria.  They  were  charged  with  several  significant
violations. The two brothers, supported by some of their bravos, had injured the nobles
Nicolò Caldogno and Achille Trissino and assassinated the noble Lelio Banca, their enemy,
by complete surprise. The petty crimes of which they were accused revealed more about
their perverse nature. In an earlier procession of the Corpus Domini, these men bullied
their way into a group of marching women, touching them in indecent fashion and using
heavy  and  blasphemous  language.  One  innkeeper,  whose  wife  had  been  raped,  was
beaten, so he tried to escape by fleeing to a local leper hospital. In addition to being
exposed  to  highly  contagious  sick  people,  the  man  was  actively  pursued  inside  the
unfortunate huts of the dying33.
33 It appears that the family of Marco and Nicolò were also implicated in the feud: Giulio
Trissino and Lelio Banca had testified in favour of Guido Capra in the trial for the injury
to Iseppo dal Castello. The strategy of the Loschis on this occasion was typical: at the
proclamation convened to charge the prisoners with their crimes, the brother facing the
lesser penalty appeared, while the brother charged with the more serious crimes was
absent. After having spent four years in pre-trial detention, Nicolò Loschi was condemned
for vitae moribus to four years of confinement in Candia. Marco and one of his bravos,
failing to appear in court,  were at  the time already banned in perpetuity,  and their
property was confiscated for the advantage of the relatives of Lelio Banca.
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34 The rivalry with the Bancas apparently led Marco, pursued by outlaws and enemies, to set
fire to their palace situated in the village of Noventa on the night between the third and
fourth of July 1586. For this last crime, on 2nd August, he was condemned with his bravo 
Francesco Lanza to be bannedin perpetuity with a reward of 1,000 lire set on his head.
Despite he was noble, if captured he would not be decapitated but shamefully hanged. In
that period Ludovico da Porto and his bandits made their way to Grancona, a small village
not far from Noventa, to accomplish a criminal act which was supposed to alienate their
parents’ solidarity: the kidnapping of one of their cousins, Alessandro da Porto, in order
to obtain a ransom from their family34.
35 Ludovico was becoming an expert, as we shall see, in the art of burning buildings. But he
did not participate in the enterprise in Noventa. Only in the middle of August, until the
end of their lives, did the path of destiny for these two nobles, apparently so very much
alike, meet tragically.
They were sleeping,  said Ludovico Porto,  Marco Loschi,  Zabarella and Francesco
Lanza. Their Veronese colleagues quietly took away their weapons, shot them with
the harquebuses and cut off all their heads. These were then sent in a sack to their
enemies Godi, Garzadori and Capra35.
36 It was October 1586. With the head of Ludovico brought to Venice, the Procurator Giacomo
Soranzo,  former  Superintendent  of  the  mainland,  would  be  emancipated  from  his
perpetual  confinement  in  Capodistria.  The  clamorous  trial  in  which  he  had  been
convicted of revealing crucial state secrets would be behind him. A similar thing would
happen to another Venetian nobleman, Marc’Antonio Grimani36.
 
The “ferocity of a hearth”
37 The key passages for understanding the career of the hero and bandit Count dominate his
existence and, one might say, determine it. The imperial diploma that bestowed the title
of Counts to the family in 1532; the testament of his grandfather, the so-called Leonardo
the posthumous in 1545; the feud with the Capras; his involvement against the Turks and
the battle of Lepanto (1571) which, by rehabilitating him from the condemnation of 1567,
had turned him into an icon of  military glory of  the lineage;  the publication of  the
paternal will (1573); the testament of his uncles Paolo, the canon, published in 1571, and
Simone, the archdeacon (1577); the crime of Cresole and the second condemnation (1579)
37.34The escape from confinement to Crete and the assassination of the Curate,  which
followed the irredeemable exile of 1585 – but also the Law of the Five Cases and the peace
with the Capras that made him an outcast – led to a whirlwind of succeeding events in the
last years: the exile of January 1586, the kidnapping of cousin Alessandro in August and
his tragic death in October38.3
38 A restless spirit with a violent nature – not considerably different from Marco Loschi and
many others –  Ludovico  represent  an exemplary  case,  if  we  consider  the  public  and
private circumstances that marked his existence in decades full of institutional, social
and economic changements.  Firmly isolated and entrenched in an inflexible  role,  he
became the paradoxical scapegoat of the feud that brought so much ruin to Vicenza’s
oligarchic  class  during  those  years39.37Nevertheless,  the  event  that  most  significantly
characterized Ludovico was his break with his lineage who abandoned him to his fate
once they sensed the threat he represented to his patrimony, to the unstable balance of
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powers  among Vicenza’s  different  social  classes,  and to  Venice’s  powers  which were
laboriously being restored. At a given moment, his own family, perhaps more than his
declared enemies, was anxiously awaiting his demise.
39 At least twice, at the end of August and then again in November 1585, Ludovico violated
his exile and penetrated the territory of Vicenza with dozens of his men in order to bring
fire and death to its enemies. The first time, after his presence had been signalled, he had
to take refuge by crossing the border of the state; of the second occasion, we read the
extraordinary account of Garzadori:
… at three hours of the night [meaning three hours after the sunset], he made his
way  to  his  house  in  Cresole,  and  entered  into  his  courtyard  […].  Ludovico  and
fourteen  other  bandits  set  fire  to  the  house  [after  there  had  been  an  intense
exchange of shots]; After a while, the smoke began to suffocate those inside; two of
the besieged climbed a window and then took to Vicenza, in their nightshirts, to
advise his enemies Godi, Capra, Garzadori [...] Da Porto, seeing he would not be able
to do anything and considering how his enemies might join forces with the arm of
justice, as the next day approached he set off to escape40.
40 Blind with rage, his anger did not spare all the confiscated property from destruction,
property which the old fideicommissa had indissolubly tied to the lineage and that his
relatives would certainly try to recover41. But perhaps what disturbed him most and may
have appealed to his most basic sense of self – he, the hero of Lepanto – was his existence
as  a  marginal  pawn in the games of  ruthless  familial  strategies;  his  being used as  a
belligerent, exalted as a great symbol at one moment, but abandoned to his destiny in the
end. On such occasion we have a first clear sign of his self-destructive anger42.
41 The small villages of Cresole and Vivaro constituted the nucleus of the da Porto title of
Counts.  They  enjoyed  immense  prestige –  possibly  greater  than  their  riches – which,
nevertheless, had been acquired in recent time. The 512 hectares which they owned in
Vivaro were occupied by the family only in 1491, thus they had to be defended with any
means necessary. The most prestigious of all these possessions, which included the tower,
was bestowed to Camillo thanks to the testament of Leonardo the posthumous in 1545.
From Camillo, it was passed on to Ludovico, the only male heir, in 157343.
42 But the division of the resources of Vivaro and Cresole among the three sons of the
deceased Leonardo was not consumated without difficulty. In 1554, the podestà of Vicenza
was compelled to consult three arbiters to settle the disputes among five competing heirs
44. Of these, Paolo and Simone were the two outstanding personalities in the panorama of
the  Vicenza’s  churchlife.  Paolo,at  a  particular  moment  of  his  life,  had  developed  a
promising  diplomatic  career45.  Although rather  old,  he  had  waged  a  serious  conflict
against the bishop Matteo Priuli in defense of the privileges of the cathedral chapter and
above all of the numerous benefits which he enjoyed. The suspension a divinis and the
excommunication of Paolo – which accompanied the publication of the diocesan synod –
marked the beginning of the Tridentine reform in Vicenza. Paolo would therefore be
subjected  to  a  humiliating  reconciliation  and  the  renunciation  of  his  benefits  and
privileges46.
43 Although the reason is still unknown, it is not difficult to imagine that the beating of the
vicar of the bishop, on 4 May 1567 is somehow related to these events47. The episode had
revealed the violent nature of the young man who believed he could ingratiate himself
with his uncles, old, rich and of course without a direct line of descendants. The young
men must have seen their uncles as men qualified to restore a notable patrimony, largely
free of conditions, to the family. Therefore, the nephews waited for the publication of
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their secret wills with particular apprehension. But bitter disillusion was to frustrate such
expectations. Paolo had died in August 1571 and in his last will,  drawn up two years
before, he had instituted an arrangement of primogeniture benefiting the descendants of
brother Giovanni, but excluding the firstborn Leonardo who, at that time, was taking up
his ecclesiastical career, and Ludovico as well. The publication of Simone’s will, which
occurred in 1577, favored the firstborn male children of Giovanni, while Ludovico was
mentioned by his uncle as the last possible heir in a long chain of heirs from Leonardo the
posthumous’ family branch48.
44 Maybe  the  two  prelates  had  imagined  that  the  nature  of  Ludovico,  and  the  lack  of
scruples  in  Leonardo,  would  produce  fateful  consequences  for  the  patrimony  of  the
family, as had happened in 1579 when Ludovico, as previously noted, had murdered a
peasant  from Cresole  and  Leonardo  had  pretended  to  marry  a  wealthy  widow from
Venice only to steal her resources. Both would be condemned, among other things, to the
confiscation of their wealth49.
 
Strategies to defend social rank (1)
45 The  man  who,  in  1545,  forged  the  nearly  sacred  tie  between  familial  prestige  and
patrimony was eighty-year-old Leonardo the posthumous50. His experience in the city’s
administration and his exposure to legal culture helped make his will a turning point
where the defense of the patrimony was the premise through an eloquent defence of wills
and fideicommissa:
Aliquando per successiones foeminarum, aliquando per debita et aliis accidentibus
facultates alienari et devolvi ... extra familias deffunctorum ... Sapientes existimati
... testamenta et fideicommissa ... constituerent ut sua bona et facultates non solum
ad  filios,  nepotes  et  pronepotes,  et  alios  ex  sua  linea  dividentes,  sed  etiam  ad
agnatos transversales ordine successivo ... integre ... devenirent
46 Naturally, the exclusion of women and the establishment of a very strict fidei-commissum
over free properties followed; the old jurist did not fail to prohibit every deduction of the
Falcidian  portion  on  bequests.  Thus,  only  a  number  of  infinite  replacements  should
remedy the potentialdemographic disasters  that  the future generations of  the family
might experience. In the end, he included another patrimonial tutelage disinheriting the
heir who had been condemned to confiscation51.
47 In spite of limitations set by both statute and common law and some jurisprudential
adjustments, the document retained a large measure of its original efficacy as a strong
legal support to the sanction of the individual will. While the “spiritual will” enjoyed a
revival  within  the  Catholic  countries  during  the  Counter-Reformation52,  other  wills
occasionally were drawn up to change the structure of legitimate succession53; especially
after the middle of the sixteenth century, another type of will was to appear, resembling
much Leonardo’s will  a will  which was above all  political  and whose most important
purpose was to protect the patrimony and the family prestige. By betraying conventional
practice  and  the  laws  of  succession  established  by  the  majority  of  statutes – which
prescribed a joint succession for all male heirs – the institution of primogeniture, which
we saw in the wills of Paolo and Simone da Porto, represented the final phase of this
process54.
48 The replacement of the heir, praised by Leonardo in 1545, was more flexible than a formal
disinheritance yet more structured than some indefinite recommendation, which helped
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control  the  patrimonies  conveyed  to  descendants.  The  most  important  form  of
replacement  was  the fidei-commissum:  on accepting the inheritance,  the  heir  bound
himself, at the time of his death, to return the testator’s properties to one or more people
shown in the will, usually his own male descendants55. The necessity of the restitution
commanded  the  preservation  of  the  properties.  The  Trebellianica deduction  (legitime
portion), which corresponded to one-quarter of the legal assets, was thus acknowledged
to the heir via the ius commune and several other statutes56.
49 The  fidei-commissumwas  already  common  in  wills  among  the  nobility  during  the
fifteenth-century. Besides imposing it on their properties, testators often used the fidei-
commissumto remind heirs about the precedents established by the forefathers. In 1477
Giovanni  Francesco  da  Porto  recalled  the  precedents  established  by  his  ancestor
Francesco (1404) and by his  father Simone (1462)57.  During the sixteenth-century the
institution became more precise and detailed; the less and less commonly used formula,
which replaced one heir with another one on the basis of vulgariter, pupillariter et per fidei-
commissum, was counteredby the revealing prose of Leondardo da Porto the posthumous.
 
Strategies to defend social rank (2)
50 After the first confiscation suffered by Ludovico in 1584, his relatives had established a
nominee to acquire the resources auctioned off from Rialto58. After the murder of the
Curate, the Council of Ten annulled the sale and enforced confiscation of the property
subject  to  a  fidei-commissum provided  for  by  the  1578  law that  enfeoffed  with  the
property of the convicted criminals the relatives of the victims59. A great many things
seemed destined to end up in the hands of the family’s enemies – property and estates
composed of flat, fertile land, woods, a manor with tower, as well as a number of stables
filled  with  animals60.  The  fears  that  forty  years  earlier  were  originally  felt  by  the
patriarch were about to be realized. The lawyer Lucillo Cereda, brother of the priest, had
almost immediately gained possession of Ludovico’s properties, while he was to face an
attempted vendetta in November61.
51 His relatives wasted no time, putting together a defensive front by defending the estate
promised as dowry payment in the marriage of Ludovico’s sisters: the two brothers-in-
law  were  claiming  a  total  amount  of  4,300  ducats  to  be  paid  immediately  as  a
compensation for the dowries. The requests of repayment presented to the Avogaria from
those claiming the confiscated patrimony62 – the so-called contraddizioni (contradictions) –
were about fifty and amounted to approximately 10,000 ducats63. On May 29 and June 14,
the requests of the brothers-in-law were accepted, although Ludovico was still terrorizing
the  surroundings  of  Vicenza64.  Only  after  his  death  would  his  relatives –  as  direct
successors – be able to reclaim the rights relevant tothe fideicommissa and attempt to
salvage their parts of the patrimony.
52 Nevertheless, the astuteness of Lucillo Cereda, which can be easily explained through a
powerful influence of the Capras upon him, allowed him to pursue the da Portos with the
fideicommissa of  his  ancestors.  Following  the  legislation  on  confiscation,  the  fidei-
commissum could undermine the survival of the bandits’ families because of a dangerous
contradiction existing in the fidei-commissum itself. If no bonds or ties existed, only the
capital and properties of the outlaw at the moment of his crime – or the legitime portion
if the child was stilldepending on his father – would be subject to confiscation. With the
1578 law, expropriations of wider, broader proportions became possible. Whoever was
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invested with a feud was equally intended to take on loco haeredis all the rights of the
confiscated;  besides  that,  the  fidei-commissum might  have left  other  rights  dormant
knowing that sooner or later they would reemerge to benefit  in the situation.  If,  for
example, a collateral branch was bereft of male descendants, the extraneous, the enemy –
and it was exactly within this type of case that the actions of Lucillo Cereda fell – would
have been able to claim the share of property subject to the fidei-commissumwhich would
normally be judged as due to the bandit, thus striking the collateral branches.
53 The exceptional measures regarding confiscation therefore risked producing the opposite
effects of those intended by the legislators. The political instability they hoped to combat
could  be  amplified  by  such action  and those  who faced  the  problem of  patrimonial
guardianship,  particularly  after  the  measures  of  1578,  were  well  aware  of  this
consideration.  Therefore,  a  further  warning  to  the  new generations  may  have  been
necessary focusing on the one hand on the inflexible authority they might face and, on
the other, on a new measure which represented a further legal trench against
confiscation: the disinheritance of the bandits65.
54 The sentence of the Avogaria of 13 October 1588, favorable to Cereda, was contradicted by
the Council of Ten who, on 20 February 1589, reached a conclusive sentence according to
which  those  who  represented  the  victim were  not  to  be  considered  as  heirs  of  the
property subject to a fidei-commissum.
55 The exemplary case I have examined can be seen as a manoeuvre of adjustment from the
Venetian authorities. The contradictory decisions taken by the two courts involved in
these questions, the Council of Ten and the Avogaria, lead us to believe that the problems
confronted by these bodies were not readily solvable by routine solution.
56 The da Portos, therefore, began to prepare a counteroffensive examination in the hopes
of reclaiming at least  part of  the familial  patrimony that had ended in the hands of
Lucillo.  The  announced  results  were  comforting:  a  note  regarding  properties  and
resources once owned by Ludovico, but later possessed by Lucillo Cereda, declared them
to be worth 11,000 ducats. Once the fideicommissa were deducted – an issue upon which
new legal battles had been enacted – the adversary would be entitled to resources which
were worth only 2,000 ducats.
57 Meanwhile, the clash spread to wider fronts. The obstinacy with which Cereda protected
his  acquired  rights  induced  the  da  Portos  to  cause  further  troubles.  In  1608  Lucillo
reported suffering from endless persecutions. The farmers from Cresole hated Lucillo
because he had cultivated some fields that were previously used for unlawful pasturage.
When Lucillo  refused to  build a  bridge,  the  farmers  cut  down four  hundred oaks,  a
protected arboreal species used for the construction of the fleet,  so he found himself
charged by the judging magistrate of the Venetian arsenal. Lucillo certainly knew the
protections which induced them to act so recklessly.
58 In 1616, his only child Lelio was officially invested with the fief of Vivaro66. Lucillo was
short-lived, yet everything went wrong for the bandit’s relatives. The last event, which
would have marked the beginning of  the da Portos’  counterattack,  had not yet  been
written. The wait would last eighteen years, and a new generation was to enter the lists
during the interim.
59 Once obtained the pronuncia a legge – ratification of legal validity attributed to a deed
according to its use in a lawsuit – of the fideicommissa instituted by Simone in 1404 and by
Leonardo the posthumous in 1545, Simone and Paolo, sons and heirs of Iseppo, set out to
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advance their interests in February 1634. Together with Girolamo, son of Francesco da
Porto, Simone and Paolo summoned Arpalice daughter of Lucillo Cereda to release the
Vivaro’s assets within eight days. Lelio had obviously died without any male son. Thus,
the line of the anomalous progeny of the Ceredas was embodied in the mechanism of the
ascending and trasversal fideicommissa of the da Porto family. Nearly half a century earlier
Lucillo had attempted such self-serving expedience without success.
60 The resistance of Arpalice was to be useless. At an initial sentence dated 17 September,
1635, the feudal investiture was revoked. Then a series of defeats would follow; in the
end, a refund for the improvements on the lands funded by her father failed to gain
recognition. With the final documents of 1640, the podestà of Vicenza ordered the seizure
of two hundred fields which, until that time, had been illegally occupied by the woman67.
The recovery of the resources confiscated from Ludovico had forced three generations of
his relatives into a long battle that consumed fifty-five years before ending in victory.
 
Conclusion
61 The  examined  strategy  in  defense  of  patrimony  was  successful  and  succeeded  in
containing the  damages  involved with confiscation.  The role  played by  the  Republic
accounts for a number of variables which, though not always evident, resulted from the
internal dialectic within Venice’s ruling class.
62 During the eighties of the sixteenth-century, increased political weight achieved by the so
colled youngs68 evoked, at least implicitly, that ancient notion of family that enjoyed great
fortune in the earliest stages of expansion of the Republic. An idea founded upon the risks
and the potential connected with the accumulation of the resources and on the division
of the portions of inheritance that ignored the fideicommissa and encouraged individual
enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  separation  of  legal  powers  between  Venice  and  the
mainlandseemed  to  fall  in  line  with  the  increasing,  and  apparently  irreversible,
centralization of power into the legislative organs and judicial institutions controlled by
the Dominant69. These developments may have encouraged the criminal legislation that
the  opposite  family  pattern –  based  upon  the  conservation  of  landed  property  and
promoting rivalry and disorder – intended to strike with force.
63 However,  the  lineage  was  quickly  perceived  as  a  fundamental  prerequisite  for  the
survival of the state, being the base of oligarchic power and its relative stability. The
fideicommissa were strongly respected within the Republic of Venice70. In 1786, Goethe was
surprised at how the fideicommissa
Enjoy great favor in the Venetian state; a property which was once countermarked
in such a  way,  may be conserved in  perpetuity  and,  although the property  has
passed through many hands, by discussing the controversy before the judges the
descendants  of  the  original  family  are  always  in  the  right  and  in  the  end  the
resources must be expropriated to their advantage71.
64 In this context, the law of 1578 struck the future heir when it was not able to strike the
property holder, but, as a matter of fact, it only marginally touched the fidei-commissum.
65 What, then, had made the law of confiscations a decisive passage in the criminal politics
of the Serenissima? The answer emerges with great evidence in the case of Ludovico da
Porto: the enfeoffing of the confiscated property to the victims’ relatives deals with the
abolition of the discretionary spaces of negotiation that allowed the culprits to obtain an
onerous pardon from the family of the plaintiff; on the other. If this allowed us to affirm
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that by acting in such a way the central power annulled the effects of the compensatory
mechanisms of the feud, we should also add that a similar measure made it more difficult
to retrieve the confiscated goods. The lineages were very likely to be deprived of the
symbolic connotation that described them, and their political prestige would therefore be
belittled.
66 We must  then consider the possibility  that  threats  directed against  the fideicommissa
appear as a space for political negotiation; a space still available in the dialogue between
the various players. The judge, the verdict, the guilty, were single and isolated elements,
but the consequences of the verdicts, which fell back on the parental groups, marked the
institution as being a fundamental ring of conjunction between the vindicatory system
and the inquisitorial one. If the original political legitimacy had progressively been lost,
now one could, by appealing perhaps to the services rendered, invoke the protection of
the central power; in 1588 the da Portos obtained immediate satisfaction after having
humiliated  themselves  and implored for  the  cancellation of  the  Avogarescan verdict
destroying their patrimony72.
67 What else, finally, of the disinheritance clause of the bandit-heir that Leonardo da Porto
the  posthumous  had  inserted  in  his  last  act  of  will  and  testament?  In  the  period
considered in this essay,  the clause was originally diffused in noble testaments often
marked by a certain legal awareness, supportive of the fideicommissa, but also protective
of the free portions of the inheritance73. On the contrary, nowhere in the contradictions
introduced in Venice in the confiscation suffered by Ludovico, the clause was invoked;
thus,  we  may  infer  that  the  very  same  people  were  perfectly  aware of  its  legal
inefficiency. It would be necessary to verify such a thing more distinctly, but it may be
that,  in  Vicenza’s  civil  courts  of  first  instance – where actions on fideicommissa were
immediately conveyed, and where members of the aristocracy were seated to judge –
there existed some sort of awareness of the existence of ineffective clauses. We may also
imagine that the relatives of the victims did not always have the strength and resouces to
appeal to Venice. They might also not care. A local judgement implicitly reestablished the
compensatory logic for which the fideicommissary trustee, reuniting in himself the dual
nature of heir and descendant of whom the proprieties had been confiscated, had on one
side the right to the restitution of the assets but, on the other, he was held responsible for
reimbursing the price74.  Thus the “clause”, which implicitly strengthened the callback
expressed from the fidei-commissum to the traditional ideological values that supported
the lineage, assumed in itself a certain character of consolidation: in other words, the
“clause” consolidated a building from the inside, while the fidei-commissum had the task
of safeguarding that building from the outside.
68 Leonardo da Porto the posthumous was a man of solid experience in worldly matters and
a man who understood the secrets of power. With far-seeing insight, in 1545 he had been
able to anticipate the fate of  his  lineage as  a  complex obstacle  course.  The cautious
attitude of the old patriarch often seemed to fall apart under adverse fate. But nearly a
century after that exemplary testament, which protected the family patrimony thanks to
a  fidei-commissum  and  a  defensive  clause,  and  despite  Ludovico’s  and  some  other
descendants’  condemnations75,  the  strategy  that  had  been  enacted  proved  to  be
unassailable  and  the  enterprises  of  bandit  Ludovico da  Porto  could  be  forgotten.  In
contrast,  the short biography that Giacomo Marzari  dedicated in 1591 to the hero of
Lepanto in his History of Vicenza stood as a reminder against the wear and tear of memory
and generations:
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Ludovico Da Porto, son of legal advisor Camillo, [...] is second to nobody in valor,
having commanded a galley built for Her Serenity for the many occurrences of the
memorable war against the Turks, and especially in the battle day of the Curzolari
[Lepanto], which was proof of his great courage and of the ferocity of his heart76.
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Da Porto genealogy




1404, April 25 Vicenza voluntarily enters the Venetian State
1532, December 12 The da Portos become counts palatine.
1541, June 12 Venice imposes the first reform of Vicenza’s Council of 100.
1545, October 12 Death of Leonardo the posthumous da Porto.
1560, December 16 The Council of Ten authorises the killing of anyone caught while
committing flagrant crime.
1567, January The da Portos attempt a lockout of the Council of 100.
1567, January 4 The priests Simone and Paolo da Porto are suspended a divinis by the
bishop of Vicenza.
1567, March 23 After he renounces his benefices, Paolo da Porto’s excommunication is
revoked.
1567, May 4 Ludovico da Porto forces one of his men to beat the vicar of the bishop of
Vicenza.
1567, October 2 The Council of Ten exiles Ludovico to Capodistria.
1569, December 31 Last will of Paolo da Porto, the canon (published at his death in 1571).
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1570, August 16 Last will of Camillo da Porto, father of Ludovico (published in 1573).
1571, October 7 Ludovico da Porto captains a ship in the battle of Lepanto.
1572, April 19 Hired assassins try to kill Iseppo dal Castello.
1573, February 15 Death of Camillo da Porto; Ludovico becomes tyrant of Cresole.
1575, August 12 Muzio da Porto wounds Guido Capra; he is imprisoned in Venice.
1577, September 9 Last will of Simone da Porto, the archdeacon (published a few days later).
1578, May 14 The Council of Ten puts an end to the imprisonment of Muzio da Porto.
1578, September 26 The Council of Ten promulgates the law against bandits’ fideicommissa.
1579, November 7 Ludovico da Porto kills a peasant in Cresole. He is imprisoned first in
Vicenza, then in Venice.
1580, May 20 The Venetian Senate assigns extraordinary criminal powers to the
mainland governors.
1584, April 27 Ludovico da Porto is condemned to twenty-two years’ exile in Crete and to
the confiscation of his free property.
1585, April 3 Peace between the Capras and da Portos.
1585, July 21 Ludovico da Porto escapes from jail and kills Francesco Cereda, parish
priest of Cresole.
1585, July 26 Sentence of the Council of Ten against Ludovico da Porto. Following the
provisions of the September 1578 law, confiscation extends to his 
fideicommissa.
1585, October 26 Law of the Five Cases.
1585, November 4 Francesco da Porto and Odorico Capra defend Vicenza’s interests against
the Law of the Five Cases.
1586, October 21 The decapitated head of Ludovico is displayed in Vicenza and Venice.
1588, October 13 The Venetian court of Avogaria sentences in favour of Lucillo Cereda’s
right to Ludovico’s fideicommissa. The da Porto patrimony is threatened.
1589, February 20 The Council of Ten sentences that those who represent the victim must
not be considered heirs to the fideicommissa.
1616, November 23 Lelio Cereda, son of Lucillo, is officially invested with the fief of Vivaro.
1635, September 17 The 1616 feudal investiture is revoked.
Banditry and Social Identity in the Republic of Venice. Ludovico da Porto, hi...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 11, n°1 | 2007
23
1637, August 13 The Avogaria sentences that Arpalice Cereda, daughter of Lucillo, must
return the confiscated estate to the da Porto.
 
Archives, Sources, Abbreviations
Archivio di Stato, Venice ASVE
Consiglio dei Dieci, Criminali CXCr
 Comuni CXCo
Avogaria di Comun, Miscellanea penale ACP
 Miscellanea civile ACC
Archivio di Stato, Vicenza ASVI
Archivio Da Porto, Processi APP
 Instrumenti API
Notarile  N
Collegio dei Notai  CN
Biblioteca Bertoliana, Vicenza BBVI
 Archivio Torre AT
 Manuscripts Ms
case = b., register = reg.; recto = r, verso = v.
  
NOTES
1. Venetians sometimes called them concessiones, meaning that the state could revoke or override
them at will. On the historiography of myth and countermyth see Povolo (2000, p. 491 ff.) and the
editors’ introduction in Martin, Romano (2000, pp. 2-5); see also Grubb (1988, pp. x-xi, 10-13).
2. (Stone 1965, pp. 746-752, quotation p. 750).
3. In the last twenty years studies on the Administration of Justice in the Venetian Republic have
produced a great number of papers, starting mainly with the works of Gaetano Cozzi and Claudio
Povolo and the congress on Venice in 1983: Ortalli(1986). Povolo has framed the arguments best,
providing the most complex and suggestive points; Povolo (1997); a good summary and synthesis
of the present state of the research are given by Chiodi (1999, 2004).
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4. Ironically,  the  Ludovico  da  Porto  asked  them  why  they  had  not  already  eliminated  the
murderer of their father. Ottaviano Capra supposedly answered: Do you want us to challenge the
sky? In six months we have made two attempts to murder him, yet neither has killed him. But we will follow
him and he will not escape. ASVE, ACP, b. 4372, p. 85v. Count Alfonso da Porto was later invited to
join Guido Capra and his braves to take part in the public assassination of Bortolo’s uncle and
accomplice Iseppo dal Castello at a peasant feast. Iseppo, warned, obviously avoided attending
the feast. Guido, furious and humiliated, challengingly watched Bernardino Toaldo and his son
Camillo for a considerable time, weapons in hand, knowing that Iseppo was protected by these
two men. In the peace of 1585, the Toaldos were listed among the “friends” of the da Portos.
Ibidem, pp. 90r-91r.
5. On 1575-28.8 the Council of Ten had ordered the governors of Vicenza to immediately send to
the capital the case developed some days before involving Guido Capra, Muzio da Porto and their
allies. ASVE, CXCr, Reg. 12, p. 105r-107r. The trial for the injury of Iseppo is essential to retrace
several aspects of the feud and is conserved in ASVE, ACP, b. 4372. Quotations to be found in p.2r,
2v, 96r.
6. The repressive measures of justice in the Venetian Republic are summarized in English by
Laven (1994, pp. 223-230).
7. The peace can be read in ASVI, APP, b. 19/293, p. 17. The nomination of the ambassadors to
Venice is in BBVI, AT, b. 865, p. 496 r. v. The inventory of the goods confiscated from Ludovico is
in ASVI, APP, B. 19/293, pp. 91-109. The evaluation of the goods is in ASVI, APP, b. 18/282 p. 3. On
the 1585 peace see Zamperetti (1984, p. 110). For the Law of the Five Cases, and more in general the
chronology of the legislative measures in criminal matters adopted in Venice, Povolo (1986 pp.
28-51).  By this time, the Consulate was the last bulwark of the Vicenza’s aristocracy political
power. Povolo (1997).
8. On the feud and revenge see Sbriccoli (2002, pp. 164-167).
9. Hobsbawn (1971, p. 60). On the peaces in the Republic of Venice see Marcarelli (2004).
10. ASVE, CXCr. b. 19, 1579-11.11. Appeal of Pellegrina Bonzolato. Written by an able lawyer,
probably belonging to the faction of the Capras, the document is the result of a legal rhetoric
depicting the culprit mainly as an enemy of the state. In it, the murder seems to be the apex of a
chain of crimes, among which the most emphatic one is the usurpation of sovereignty. Ludovico
imposes corvées to the peasants; he wants his braves to deliver corporal punishment publicly; he
injures the religious men even on the altar, he violates the female countrywomen, beating with
sticks  the  relativeswho dare  to  oppose  him.  The rural  communities’  senior  members  do not
denounce him even though they should, and nobody dares to testify against him out of fear for
their lives. The brother of the female beggar and orphan was murdered for defending her honor
against the Count’s attempts of sexual harassment. Even the community of Orgiano, who had
suffered for years under various repressions, appealed to the Council of Ten in August 1605 when
Paolo Orgiano insulted the honor of a fatherless young woman. Povolo (1988, 1991b, 1993, 1997,
2003). On feminine honor Povolo (1997, pp. 356-362); Lavarda (2002, pp. 69-81).
11. The fidei-commissum was a testamentary provision whereby a testator bound his heir to
transfer part of the estate, often the whole patrimony, to a stated person or persons, usually
identified as the male descendants. This prevented the heir from disposing freely of the estate
except for the legittima,  a  portions of  at  least  25% of the testator’s  patrimony,  (the so-called
Trebellianica and Falcidia). Benoit (1544, II pp. 18v ff), Trifone (1961, pp. 192 ff). For institutional
and economic circumstances in which the fidei-commisum functioned see Cooper (1976, pp. 230
ff).
12. Priori  (1622,  pp.  70-71).  In  Tuscany,  as  of  1548,  all  the  allodial  and  feudal  goods  were
confiscated from the culprits  at  the moment  of  the crime;  the hereditary  rights  and all  the
property subsequently acquired – even the dowries of the wives that did not have sons – were
also sequestrated.  The ascending confiscationwas not new; it  was included in the statutes of
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Padua in 1313,  of  Modena in 1327,  and Lucca in 1539.  Pertile (1966,  V,  pp.  236,  237).  On the
chronology of the legislative measures, see Povolo (1986, p. 26), Tagliaferri (1976, p. 101). The
corrispondence  between  richness  and  virtue  is  underlined  also  by  Puppi  (1973,  pp.  18-19);
Maravall (1984); Casey (1991, pp. 124-145). Povolo (1997, p. 265).
13. Basaglia (1986); Laven (1994); Povolo (2004, p. 84).
14. Povolo (1986), pp. 48-49. Lippomano’s report can be read in Tagliaferri (1976, p. 63).
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ABSTRACTS
In the later sixteenth century the Venetian state suffered from widespread criminal violence.
Government  set  harsher  penalties  and  in  1578  even  authorized  confiscating  condemned
criminals’ fideicommissa, assigning their property to murder victims’ relatives. Outlaws’ families
therefore had to use subtle  legal  defence,  since this  law affected their  wealth but  also their
honour and feuding’s compensatory mechanisms.
Count Ludovico da Porto, bandit and hero, symbolizes the power struggle among Vicenza’s main
noble families; his experience and the confiscation of his property exemplify Venetian action to
control the turbulent mainland state, proving the long-term efficacy of the exceptional measures
taken.
Pendant la deuxième moitié du XVIe siècle, la République de Venise était bouleversée par une
violence généralisée.  En 1578,  après quelques lois  qui  aggravaient les peines,  l’État  parvint à
confisquer les fidéicommis des coupables, assignant leurs biens aux familles des victimes.
Les maisons des nobles malfaiteurs eurent recours alors aux défenses légales les plus subtiles, car
cette loi frappait leurs richesses aussi bien que leur honneur et les mécanismes de compensation
du droit de vengeance.
Le comte Ludovico da Porto, héros et bandit, symbolise le conflit parmi les familles de la haute
noblesse à Vicence. Ses vicissitudes et l’histoire de son patrimoine confisqué mettent en lumière
l’efficacité dans le temps des mesures extraordinaires adoptées par la Serenissima et son rôle de
contrôle sur les périphéries agitées.
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